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THE RULE OF LENITY IN THE STATE OF MONTANA:
IS THERE LENITY?
Angelica Gonzalez*

I. INTRODUCTION
Is hashish oil “marijuana?”1 To a person not trained in the law it might
appear as though a statute is black and white, but to a person that has been
trained to fish out and dissect even the most mundane words, a seemingly
clear statute may contain many shades of gray. Just as there are various
theories of statutory interpretation, from legal process and new textualism
to economic and pragmatic theories, there are also various doctrines of statutory interpretation. These doctrines include ordinary meaning rules, textual
canons, and substantive policy canons. These doctrines serve as guiding
principles for judges and lawyers to aid in the interpretation of statutes.
When interpreting a statute, a court traditionally looks to the plain language of the statute to discern the legislative intent.2 A court usually accomplishes this by first looking at the words in the statute and applying the
usual and ordinary meaning of the words used. If, after employing the traditional rules of statutory construction and interpretation, a penal statute re* J.D. candidate, 2018, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana. I wish
to extend a special thanks to Anthony Johnstone, an exemplary professor and mentor, who has had
unwavering faith in my capacity, has motivated me to strive for excellence, and has been a pillar of
support throughout my law school tenure. I am grateful for the opportunity to pursue an advanced
degree at this institution and look forward to what the future holds.
1. The Montana Supreme Court held that hashish did not fall within the Montana Marijuana Act’s
“useable marijuana” exception to the Controlled Substance Act and the rule of lenity did not require that
the Montana Marijuana Act be interpreted to include hashish as useable marijuana. State v. Pirello, 282
P.3d 662 (Mont. 2012).
2. 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 238 (2018).
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mains unclear or ambiguous, then some courts apply the common law rule
of lenity, also referred to as the rule of strict construction: ambiguous statutes should be strictly construed in favor of the defendant.3
This note examines how the rule of lenity is applied in the Montana
Supreme Court and ultimately demonstrates that the Court’s understanding
of the rule’s application is not always clear. The first application of the rule
of lenity occurred in 1922.4 From 1922 to 1933, the Montana Supreme
Court applied the rule of lenity, despite it not being codified in Montana
since 1895.5 In 1934, the Court correctly cited to the statute that abrogated
the common law rule of strict construction in Montana by looking to the
Revised Codes of 1921.6 However, only four years later, in 1938, the Court
returned to the application of the rule of strict construction until 1993.7 In
1993, in State v. Turner,8 the Court notably did not apply the rule of lenity
to the penal code in Montana. Defendants continued to challenge the
Court’s holding in Turner by raising the rule of lenity, but the Court continued to follow the rule of strict construction, without regard to whether that
construction favors the defendant, after Turner.9 Since 1993, the Court has
not actually applied the rule of lenity. The Court allows the rule of lenity to
cause commotion in cases but refuses to give it force. Without its application in cases where it has been raised, the rule is simply a noisemaker rather
than a tool of statutory interpretation.
In most cases in which the rule of lenity has been raised, the Court has
declined to consider it and failed to justify its decision to not apply the rule
of lenity.10 Currently, the Court (with the exception of Turner) gives the
illusion that the rule of lenity exists, but does not apply the rule because it
finds that the statutes are clear and unambiguous even in instances when the
statute is, in fact, ambiguous.11 The Court could end the illusion of the
existence of the rule of lenity by simply adhering to and enforcing the provisions found in Montana Code Annotated § 45–1–102. The Court need
only rely on the text of the statute, which requires construing the provisions
in the penal code “according to the fair import of their terms with a view to
its effect and to promote justice.”12 Tracing the statute back to when it was
first enacted, the original meaning and legislative intent of giving the terms
3. Id.
4. State v. Bowker, 205 P. 961, 963 (Mont. 1922).
5. Id., at 961; Shubat v. Glacier Cty., 18 P.2d 614, 615 (Mont. 1932).
6. State ex rel. Kurth v. Grinde, 32 P.2d 15, 16 (Mont. 1934).
7. State ex rel. Juhl v. Dist. Court of First Judicial Dist., 84 P.2d 979, 982 (Mont. 1938).
8. 864 P.2d 235, 235 (Mont. 1993).
9. State v. Weigle, 947 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Mont. 1997); Gollehon v. State, 986 P.2d 395, 402
(Mont. 1999).
10. See infra Appendix 1.
11. Id.
12. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–1–102(2) (2017).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol79/iss2/3

2

Gonzalez: The Rule of Lenity
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\79-2\MON203.txt

2018

unknown

Seq: 3

19-OCT-18

THE RULE OF LENITY

13:59

207

their fair import and promoting justice is still applicable today. It, unlike the
rule of lenity, is law in Montana and therefore governs.
If the judicial branch in the “last best place” is truly concerned with
promoting justice and protecting individual rights, then it should follow the
general purposes stated in § 45–1–102 to forbid and prevent conduct that
unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threaten to inflict harm to individual or public interests.13 This note argues that safeguarding faultless conduct from condemnation as criminal should be a priority, and the first two
sections of this note explore how the rule of lenity and Montana’s complicated relationship with it do not always promote that goal. The final section
includes four cases that demonstrate why providing defendants with fair
warning of the nature of the conduct that constitutes an offense should be of
utmost priority for the judicial branch. Lastly, this note emphasizes that
differentiating between serious and minor offenses is a principle that cannot
be underplayed. If after applying § 45–1–102(2), the decisions and judgments delivered by the Court do not promote justice, then maybe the legislature will step up to the plate and write statutes that clearly express their
intent.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical and Legal Setup of the General Law
The rule of lenity provides that ambiguous statutes should be construed narrowly in favor of the defendant. It has its founding in fourteenthcentury England where it was “developed . . . in response to a legal regime
that punished [the majority] of crimes by hanging.”14 At the time, capital
punishment was the most common form of punishment, and the doctrine of
the benefit of clergy exempted clergy from the death penalty based on a
literacy test.15 English Monarchs, in an effort to counteract the evasion of
punishment, passed statutes that excluded certain felonies from the benefit
of clergy.16
The United States inherited this concept, now known as the rule of
lenity. The rule of lenity has become a principle of judicial restraint, mandating that legislatures define the crime, thereby providing notice to the
defendant.17 In courts that apply it, the “rule of lenity . . . applies only
when, after consulting traditional canons of statutory construction [a court
13. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–1–102.
14. Lawrence Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 87 (1998).
15. Sarah Newland, The Mercy of Scalia: Statutory Construction and the Rule of Lenity, 29 HARV.
C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 197, 199 (1994).
16. Id. at 200.
17. Id. at 201.
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is] is left with an ambiguous statute.”18 If the statute is not ambiguous, then
the rule of lenity cannot be used. At the federal level, it is only applicable if
there is grievous ambiguity.19
The rule of lenity’s core focus is providing fair warning to defendants.
“The American rule of lenity insists that only the legislature define crime,
and that the definition be clear and precise before courts may impose punishment.”20 Additionally, “[i]ts frequent use in the late 19th century led
some state legislatures to pass statutes forbidding the strict construction of
penal laws.”21 Not all states codified the rule; in fact, only 36 states codified
it and as of 2013, 28 of those 36 states have abolished or reversed their
rule.22
The rule has undergone periods of dormancy, but most recently Justice
Scalia is credited with reviving the canon at the United States Supreme
Court level. Justice Scalia, a known critic of the use of legislative history,
was a strong believer that the rule of lenity should be applied before legislative history. He stated that, “in [his] view it is not consistent with the rule of
lenity to construe a textually ambiguous penal statute against a criminal
defendant on the basis of legislative history.”23
B. The Policy Behind the Rule of Lenity
One of the main policy reasons behind the rule of lenity is a concern
for a defendant’s due process rights. Statutes that delineate criminal conduct
must be written to ensure that potential defendants receive proper notice of
the crime allegedly committed and its consequences.24 Another policy reason behind the rule of lenity is safeguarding the separation of powers,
which “imply a policy of judicial restraint in effectuating the intent of the
legislature.”25 From this background and history, the rule of lenity finds its
obscure place in American jurisprudence, requiring a closer analysis of its
application in the Montana court system. It is beneficial to all parties involved to gain an understanding of how the Montana Supreme Court has
punted on the issue by failing to employ the statutory canon of construction
and instead sending it to the legislature to define statutes.
18. United States v. Bustillos-Pena, 612 F.3d 863, 868 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v.
Shabani, 513 U.S. 10 (1994)).
19. See Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 488 (2010).
20. Newland, supra note 15, at 201.
21. Id. at 202.
22. WILLIAM ESKRIDGE ET AL., LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY 695 (5th ed. 2014).
23. Newland, supra note 15, at 217 (citing United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291 (1992)).
24. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 188 (2018); see Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112 (1979)
(citations omitted).
25. Newland, supra note 15, at 203.
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LENITY?

The Rule of Lenity is Not Codified in Montana

In 1889, Montana was formally admitted to the union and its third
proposed constitution was written, ratified, and adopted.26 In 1972, the
Montana Constitution was ratified27 and the term length for Montana Supreme Court Justices was extended from six to eight years.28 The judicial
branch in Montana is made up of the Montana Supreme Court, state district
courts, the worker’s compensation court, the water court, and the courts of
limited jurisdiction (justice courts, municipal courts, and city courts).29 The
Montana Supreme Court hears direct appeals from the all the state district
courts because there is no intermediate appellate court in the state.30
To provide some background, the codification of laws in 1895
originated from the draft codes known as the Field Code, prepared by David
Dudley Field for the state of New York.31 The Field Code was divided into
four separate codes: the Civil Procedure Code, the Penal Code, the Political
Code, and the Civil Code.32 To put the amount of law adopted into perspective, “the Fourth Montana Legislature adopted more than 170 pounds of
laws, an estimated 784,000 words, during 42 days.”33 After such a voluminous passage of laws, it is not surprising that Montana attorneys and judges
were uncertain as to what the laws actually were at that time. Montana had
just become a state in 1889, and the codification of the Field Codes provided Montana the opportunity it needed to establish itself as a progressive
state at the forefront of legal reform.34 The adoption of the Field Codes was
described as a reorganization of existing Montana law.35 However, this was
an inaccurate description because the Field Codes were not Montana law at
all. The proponents of the codification opted for adoption of the Field
Codes and then revising them in the future.36
The common law rule of lenity, that ambiguous statutes are to be
strictly construed in favor of the defendant, was never codified in the Mon26. See G. Alan Tarr,?The Montana Constitution: A National Perspective, 64 MONT. L. REV. 1, 2
(2003).
27. Tyler Stockton, Originalism and the Montana Constitution, 77 MONT. L. REV. 117, 117 (2016).
28. Mont. Judicial Branch, Brief History of the Montana Judicial Branch, STATE OF MONT. https://
perma.cc/T5T6-XZY3 (last visited April 10, 2018).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Andrew P. Morriss, “This State Will Soon Have Plenty of Laws”– Lessons from One Hundred
Years of Codification in Montana, 56 MONT. L. REV. 359, 366 (1995).
32. Id. at 369
33. Id. at 360.
34. Id. at 363.
35. Id. at 388.
36. Id. at 389.
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tana Code Annotated and it remains that way today. Instead, Montana codified a statute that specifically mandates that the strict construction of penal
statutes is not to be applied to the Code, a position that can be traced back
through the last century. The statute currently reads as follows:
(1) The general purpose of the provisions governing the definition of offenses are:
(a) to forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threatens harm to individual or public interests;
(b) to safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as
criminal;
(c) to give fair warning of the nature of the conduct declared to constitute an offense;
(d) to differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor
offenses.
(2) The rule of common law that penal statutes are to be strictly construed has no application to this code. All its provisions are to be construed according to the fair import of their terms with a view to effect
its object and to promote justice.37

To understand how Montana arrived at its current definition requires
some background. In 1947, the laws were codified as the Revised Codes of
Montana and the statute was renumbered as § 94–1–101, but the text remained the same.38 Then in 1973, one year after the Montana Constitution
was written, the Montana Criminal Code was once again revised. In 1973,
the statute was renumbered as § 94–1–102, and a substantial portion was
added. The original statute became § 2, and the added portion is what is
currently § 1(a)–(d).
(1) The general purposes of the provisions governing the definition of
offenses are:
(a) to forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threatens harm to individual or public interests;
(b) to safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation
as criminal;
(c) to give fair warning of the nature of the conduct declared to
constitute an offense;
(d) to differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses.
(2) The rule of the common law, that penal statutes are to be strictly construed, has no application to this code. All its provisions are to be construed
37. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–1–102(2) (emphasis added). In the interest of providing the most complete history possible, it is also important to understand that this current version of the statute has
developed from the original 1895 statute, which read as follows: “The rule of the common law, that
penal statutes are to be strictly construed, has no application to this Code. All its provisions are to be
construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its object and to promote
justice.” CODES AND STAT. OF MONT. § 4 prelim. prov. (1895).
38. Rev. Codes of Mont. 1947 § 94–1101 (1973).
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according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its object
and to promote justice.39

Again taking inspiration from another state, Section (1) (a)–(d) has its origin in the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961, which reads as follows:
(1) The provisions of this Code shall be construed in accordance with the
general purposes hereof, to:
(a) Forbid and prevent the commission of offenses;
(b) Define adequately the act and mental state which constitute each
offense, and limit the condemnation of conduct as criminal when it is
without fault;
(c) Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of offenses and which permit recognition of differences in rehabilitation possibilities among individual offenders;
(d) Prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons accused or convicted of offenses.40

At the earliest point in the relevant history, the statute abrogating the
common law rule of lenity was first codified in 1895.41 However, as noted
above, the statute originated from the Field Code prepared for New York,
not for Montana. The Montana Legislature hastily adopted the Codes, perhaps without giving much thought to the fact that the statutes were written
for a state that differs greatly from Montana.
In 1947, purpose provisions taken from the Illinois Criminal Code
were added to the original statute. The provisions taken from Illinois emphasized the same fair-warning policy reason that the rule of lenity is concerned with. This purpose statement is almost identical to the due process
concern of providing defendants with notice of what he or she is charged
with and the consequences that may result.
B. Case Law in Montana
In Montana, the rule of lenity has made its appearance in 21 Montana
Supreme Court cases.42 Of those 21 cases, 19 are still good law.43 In only
39. Rev. Codes of Mont. 1947 § 94–1101 (1973); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–1–102 (2017) (emphasis added).
40. ILL. CRIM. CODE OF 1961, art. 1, § 1–2.
41. CODES AND STAT. OF MONT. § 4 prelim. prov. (1895).
42. See State v. Bowker, 205 P. 961, 962 (Mont. 1922); Shubat v. Glacier Cty., 18 P.2d 614, 615
(Mont. 1932); State ex rel. Kurth v. Grinde, 32 P.2d 15, 16 (Mont. 1934); State ex rel. Juhl v. Dist. Court
of First Judicial Dist., 84 P.2d 979, 980 (Mont. 1938); Shipman v. Todd, 310 P.2d 300 (Mont. 1957);
State ex rel. Penhale v. State Highway Patrol, 321 P.2d 612 (Mont. 1958); Montana Auto. Ass’n v.
Greely, 632 P.2d 300 (Mont. 1981); State v. Gollehon, 864 P.2d 249 (Mont. 1993); State v. Turner, 864
P.2d 235, 236 (Mont. 1993); State v. Berger, 856 P.2d 552 (Mont. 1993); Moore v. McCormick, 858
P.2d 1254 (Mont. 1993); Gollehon v. State, 986 P.2d 395, 396 (Mont. 1999); State v. Faque, 4 P.3d 651
(Mont. 2000); State v. Liefart, 43 P.3d 329 (Mont. 2002); State v. Bailey, 87 P.3d 1032 (Mont. 2004);
State v. Roundstone, 261 P.3d 1009 (Mont. 2011); State v. Stoner, 285 P.3d 402 (Mont. 2012); State v.
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one of those 19 cases did the Court apply the rule of lenity, reversing the
lower court’s judgment, and rule in favor of the State.44
The first case where the rule of lenity appeared was in 1922 in State v.
Bowker, where the defendant appealed his conviction of maintaining a common nuisance under the 1921 statute by conducting and maintaining a place
where intoxicating liquors were sold.45 It was the Prohibition era, and the
Court faced the question of whether the district court had jurisdiction over
the charged offense.46 It was unclear whether sections of the 1917 Act were
still in force and whether they were in conflict with or superseded by the
section in the 1921 Act. The Court “recognized that penal statutes must be
strictly construed” but “where the legislative intent is plain, there is no departure from the rule in consequence of the consideration and application of
the provisions of more than the one existing enactment on the same subject.”47 The Court stated that “it is [its] duty to reconcile the statutes, and
make them operative in accordance with the legislative intent, if at all possible.”48 This statement was significant, because by recognizing that penal
statutes must be strictly construed, the Court breathed life into the rule of
lenity, which had ceased being law in Montana in 1895.
In 1932, in Shubat v. Glacier Cty, the statute at issue was an interest
provision that imposed a penalty for delinquent taxes.49 The Court found
that the statute was penal in nature and thus was to be strictly construed.50
In reaching its decision, the Court concluded that the language used indicated the legislature’s intent and that the arrangement of the different provisions in the section confirmed the Court’s views as to the intent of the
legislature.51 Again, the Court followed the rule of strict construction.52
Two years later, in State ex rel. Kurth v. Grinde, the Court faced the
question of whether to apply the rule of lenity as urged by the appellants.53
The case was a proceeding to compel the Mayor and certain aldermen of the
Pirello, 282 P.3d 662, 662 (Mont. 2012); State v. Matheson, 311 P.3d 443 (Mont. 2013); State v. Madsen, 317 P.3d 806 (Mont. 2013); State v. Strong, 356 P.3d 1078 (Mont. 2015).
43. See Bowker, 205 P. at 962; Shubat, 18 P.2d at 615; Grinde, 32 P.2d at 16; Juhl, 84 P.2d at 980;
Penhale 321 P.2d; Mont. Auto. Ass’n, 632 P.2d; Gollehon, 864 P.2d; Turner, 864 P.2d at 236; Berger,
856 P.2d; Moore, 858 P.2d; Gollehon, 986 P.2d at 396; Liefart, 43 P.3d; Bailey, 87 P.3d; Roundstone,
261 P.3d; Stoner, 285 P.3d; Pirello, 282 P.3d at 662; Matheson, 311 P.3d; Madsen, 317 P.3d; Strong,
356 P.3d.
44. Madsen, 317 P.3d at 808.
45. Bowker, 205 P. at 962.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 963.
48. Id.
49. 18 P.2d at 615.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 616.
52. Id.
53. 32 P.2d 15, 15 (Mont. 1934).
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City of Great Falls to reinstate the relator as water registrar of the city.54
The issue presented by the case was whether the appointment of the relator
was unlawful under the nepotism law of 1933.55 Appellants argued that
since the statute was a penal statute then it “must be strictly construed.”56
The Court held that, “Section 10710, Revised Codes 1921, provides: ‘The
rule of common law, that penal statutes are to be strictly construed, has no
application to this code; All its provisions are to be construed according to
the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its object and to promote
justice.’”57 The Court clarified that its duty “to ascertain the intention of the
legislature . . . is to be ascertained from the terms of the statute, and [the
court] may not ‘insert what has been omitted, or omit what has been inserted.’”58 Here, in contrast to Bowker, the Court made a correct statement
of law when it held that the rule of lenity was not to be applied in Montana
and clarified that it would not read beyond the words in the statute. The
Court reiterated that, “[it] cannot read something into the statute which is
not there.”59
In State ex rel. Juhl v. Dist. Court of First Judicial Dist., two informations had been filed against the defendant. The defendant was charged with
willful and unlawful killing and failure to render aid to the injured person
after running over the victim on a highway.60 A new district judge was
elected, and the defense moved for the two charges to be dismissed due to
the defendant not having been taken to trial within six months.61 The motion was granted, and the county attorney then proceeded to present two
new informations with the same charges that were alleged in the original
informations.62 The defendant petitioned the Montana Supreme Court for
an alternative writ of supervisory control.63 The Court authorized the writ
and fixed the return day. Counsel for the State moved to quash the writ and
dismiss the proceeding.64 The Court heard the motion to quash and arguments on the merits, then cited to the rule of lenity, stating that, “[i]t has
always been the policy of the legislature . . . to provide for the strict construction of penal statutes in the interest of the accused.”65 The Court justified the strict construction of penal statutes as “seek[ing] no unfair advan54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 16.
at 17.
(quoting REV. CODES

OF

MONT. 1921 § 10519).

at 982.
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tage over a defendant, [the law] is watchful to see that the proceedings
under which [defendant’s] life or liberty is at stake shall be fairly and impartially conducted.”66 The writ was issued.67
It is interesting that only four years after Kurth the Court returned to
the strict construction of penal statutes in favor of the defendant. One possible reason for this outcome is that the Montana Supreme Court was composed of two new Justices. At the time that Kurth was decided the Court
was composed of Justice Angstman, Justice Callaway, Justice Matthews,
Justice Stewart, and Justice Anderson.68 Justice Calloway’s term ended in
1935 and Justice Matthews’ term ended in 1937 (he served as a Justice from
1919–1920 and subsequently as Assistant Justice from 1925–1937).69
When Juhl was decided, the Court was composed of Justice Angstman,
Justice Stewart, Justice Anderson, Justice Morris, and Justice Goddard.70
The presence of Justice Morris and Justice Goddard might have had an
impact on the Court reverting to employing the rule of lenity in Juhl since
the Court changed its stance on the rule of lenity with their presence.
In 1958, the Montana Supreme Court again encountered the rule of
lenity, but in a civil case. Appellants appealed a judgment granting a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring the Montana Highway Patrol to return
to the relatrix-respondent the license plates to the vehicle for which she was
co-owner.71 The Court applied what it referred to as the “familiar rule”
stating that “the rule, universally recognized, is that a statute of this character must be strictly construed.”72 The Court was cognizant that it is for the
legislature to write the law and that with that power comes the power of
punishment. The Court explained that
Strict construction, as applied to statutes, means that they are not be so extended by implication beyond the legitimate imports of the words used in
them . . . but that everything shall be excluded from the operation of statutes
so construed which does not clearly come within the meaning of the language used.73

The Court held that “[relator’s] registration, even though indivisible and
inseparable from that of her husband, must be excluded from the operation
of the statute.”74 Here, the Court seemed to forget that the rule of lenity
ceased to be law in 1895 and that the law at the time provided that the
66. Id.(citing to State ex rel. Foot v. Dist. Court, 263 P. 979, 981 (Mont. 1928)).
67. Id. at 983.
68. State ex rel. Kurth v. Grinde, 32 P.2d 15, 15 (Mont. 1934).
69. Mont. Memory Project, Hon. John A. Matthews, MONT. STATE LIBRARY, https://perma.cc/
WH3H-PGFB (last visited April 10, 2018).
70. Juhl, 84 P.2d at 979.
71. State ex rel. Penhale v. State Highway Patrol, 321 P.2d 612, 612 (Mont. 1958).
72. Id. at 613
73. Id. at 614 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis omitted).
74. Id. at 614.
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Code’s provisions are to be construed according to the fair import of their
terms, with a view to affect its object and to promote justice.
From 1958 through 1991, the application of the rule of strict construction was not raised or heard by the Montana Supreme Court. It wasn’t until
1991 that the Court was once again asked whether the rule of lenity applied.
In State v. Goodwin the defendant was convicted of sexual intercourse without consent, misdemeanor sexual assault, and felony assault.75 The Court
addressed the rule of lenity in responding to an issue raised by the State on
cross-appeal. The issue raised was whether the district court erred in applying the exception in Montana Code Annotated § 46–18–222(5) to the
mandatory two-year minimum.76 The district court’s sentencing suspended
all but 30 days, prompting the State’s appeal.77 Montana Code Annotated
§ 45–5–503 establishes the mandatory two-year minimum, except as provided in Montana Code Annotated § 46–18–222.78 The State argued that
a reasonable construction of § 46–18–222(5), MCA, [the exception that the
Court applied], requires the conclusion that the exception to the minimum
sentence is applicable in only those cases where the threat of bodily injury
or actual infliction of bodily injury is an essential element of the crime.79

The State further argued that § 45–5–503(3)(a) “increases the penalty in [ ]
cases where the victim is under 16 years [old] or where bodily injury is
inflicted on the victim.”80 The Court “agree[d] that in reconciling these two
provisions there [was] at least an ambiguity regarding the meaning of
‘where applicable’ in [the] cases where the victim is under the age of 16
. . . , or where some injury less than ‘serious bodily injury’ [had] been
inflicted on the victim.”81 The Court commented on how the legislature
could have easily made its intentions clear but did not. The Court stated
that, “it must interpret the criminal statute in a way most favorable to the
private citizen against whom it is sought to be enforced, and against the
state which authored it.”82
The Court applied the rule of lenity without expressly stating that it
was applying the rule of lenity in its reading of the statutes in Goodwin. The
Court did, however, state that it was “compelled to follow the classic rule
of construction of criminal statutes which is . . . [that] [p]enal statutes are
75. 813 P.2d 953, 955 (Mont. 1991), overruled by State v. Turner, 864 P.2d 235, 241 (Mont. 1993)
(holding that “[i]nsofar as Goodwin is in conflict with § 45–1–102(2) MCA, it is overruled.”), overruled
on other grounds by State v. Lawrence, 948 P.2d 186 (Mont. 1997).
76. Goodwin, 813 P.2d at 965.
77. Id. at 955.
78. Id. at 965–66; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–5–503; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46–18–222.
79. Id. at 966.
80. Id. (emphasis omitted).
81. Id.
82. Id.
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construed with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the defendant.”83
The Court even went on to state that it agreed with the United States Supreme Court’s rule of interpretation that “ambiguity concerning the ambit
of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.”84 The Court discussed the policy reasons for applying the rule as: 1) fair warning and 2)
that “legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity” because of
the seriousness of criminal penalties and punishments.85 The Court held that
“any ambiguity regarding the applicability of this exception must be ‘resolved in favor of lenity.’”86
Goodwin established that the rule of lenity was triggered by an ambiguity in the statute (Goodwin was overturned two years later by Turner).
Initially, this would appear to be a positive outcome for defendants. However, now defendants faced the challenge of how to trigger application of
the rule of lenity since the Court provided little guidance.
The rule of lenity in Montana is only applied when statutes are found
to be ambiguous after using all other tools of statutory interpretation. The
Court reached this conclusion in Moore v. McCormick, where the petitioner,
a defendant convicted of deliberate homicide pending appeal, filed an application for writ of habeas corpus and argued that the statute was ambiguous,
and therefore, the rule of lenity should apply.87 The Court concluded that
the statute was not ambiguous because the “plain intendment of the language used” was an if “X then Y” mandate, but since the district court
below did not do X it was then not mandated to do Y.88
In the criminal cases since 1993, in which the defendants have raised
the rule of lenity as a defense, judges have concluded that the statute at
issue was unambiguous or they have explicitly declined to apply the rule of
lenity.89 When the Court declines to apply the rule of lenity, the Court does
not explain why the rule does not apply.90 Appendix 1 shows a list of the
criminal cases since 1993 in which the rule of lenity was raised. The appendix also shows that the Court has found that ambiguous statutes were “unambiguous” and thus has held that the rule of lenity has not been triggered.

83. Id. (citing 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 188) (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 967 (quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)) (internal quotations
omitted).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 858 P.2d 1254, 1254, 1256 (Mont. 1993).
88. McCormick, 858 P.2d at 1256.
89. See e.g. State v. Stoner, 285 P.3d 402, 406 (Mont. 2012).
90. For more information on the subject matter of cases over the decades, see infra Appendix 1.
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DOING?

As demonstrated in Appendix 1, it is obvious that the rule of lenity is
not applied in Montana. Is this simply explainable by the fact that judges
and attorneys are correctly adhering to Montana Code Annotated
§ 45–1–102(2), or is there something more going on? One could argue that
the outcome reflects the fact that Montana’s penal statutes are clear and
unambiguous and therefore the rule of lenity does not come into play. However, this is not the case. There are many penal statutes that remain unclear
and are ambiguous. Should we sit quietly in the comfort of our spectator
seats and wait patiently for the next highlight? Or should we instead be
good fans cheering loudly, so that the Court can hear our support in favor of
the laws that safeguard individual or public interests and protect innocent
conduct from condemnation as criminal, in addition to providing fair warning, and that differentiate between serious and minor offenses?
A.

Application of Montana Code Annotated § 45–1–102, General
Purposes and Principles of Construction

Montana Courts have addressed § 45–1–102 in 23 cases; the first case
was addressed in 1919 and the most recent in 2016 (21 of which were heard
by the Montana Supreme Court).91 The four most recent decisions will be
addressed below to illustrate the Court’s application of the statute. The
Court in applying § 45–1–102 generally cites to one of the purpose statements found in subsection 1(a)–(d). The rule itself is found in subsection
(2) and it provides that “provisions are to be construed according to the fair
import of their terms with a view to effect its object and to promote justice.”92 The Court should consider citing to subsection (2) and subsection
(1) together rather than citing to the purpose statements standing alone. Additionally, this note contends that subsection (1) (a), (b), (c), and (d) are
conjunctive, not disjunctive. The statute does not contain the conjunction
“or” which would make the statements read as alternatives rather than a list
of intentions expressing the legislative purpose.
91. State v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 179 P. 460 (Mont. 1919); Rosebud Cty v. Flinn, 98 P.2d 330
(Mont. 1940); Grady v. City of Livingston, 141 P.2d 346 (Mont. 1943); Catrino v. United States, 176
F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1949); State v. Bush, 636 P.2d 849 (Mont. 1981); State v. Palmer, 673 P.2d 1234
(Mont. 1983); State v. Taylor, 745 P.2d 337 (Mont. 1987); Goodwin, 813 P.2d; State v. Gollehon, 864
P.2d 249 (Mont. 1993); State v. Turner, 864 P.2d 235 (Mont. 1993); State v. Gollehon, 864 P.2d 1257
(Mont. 1993); State v. Tower, 881 P.2d 1317 (Mont. 1994); State v. Wakeford, 953 P.2d 1065 (Mont.
1998); State v. Abe, 965 P.2d 882 (Mont. 1998); State v. Hansen, 989 P.2d 338 (Mont. 1999); State v.
Haser, 20 P.3d 100 (Mont. 2001); State v. Liefert, 43 P.3d 329 (Mont. 2002); State v. Stevens, 53 P.3d
356 (Mont. 2002); State v. Sherer, 60 P.3d 1010 (Mont. 2002); State v. Smith, 138 P.3d 799 (Mont.
2006); City of Missoula v. Paffhausen, 289 P.3d 141 (Mont. 2012); Stewart v. State, 353 P.3d 506
(Mont. 2015); Stewart v. Green, 2016 WL 5107067 (2016).
92. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–1–102(2).
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In State v. Liefart,93 the Court found that the rule of lenity did not
apply because the statute was unambiguous.94 In its opinion, the Court cited
to Turner where the Court applied Montana Code Annotated
§ 45–1–102(2), “provid[ing] that penal statutes are not strictly construed,
leniency only applies when statutes create an ambiguity.”95 However, the
Court in Turner should not have stated that lenity only applies when there is
an ambiguity because in reality the rule of lenity has no application to the
Code. The Court in Liefart ultimately held that the defendant’s due process
rights of fair warning were not violated.96
In State v. Hansen, the defendant was convicted of deliberate homicide
and sentenced to sixty years.97 Defendant appealed and raised the issue of
“[w]hether the District Court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of [the victim’s] out-of-court statements for the purpose of establishing the corpus deliciti.”98 The Court found that the district court had erred
in admitting the evidence of victim’s out of court statements, but found it to
be a harmless error.99 Nowhere in the case is Montana Code Annotated
§ 45–1–102 cited. However, the Court made a very interesting statement
that seemed to contradict its precedent regarding the rule of lenity:
[T]he terms corpus delicti and res gestae are vague and imprecise and have
been misinterpreted and used incorrectly in the past. Therefore, we urge that
these terms not be used in future. We suggest, instead, that the practicing bar
and trial courts of this State rely on the clearer and more precise statements
of the law, i.e., the Montana Code Annotated and the Montana Rules of
Evidence, rather than vague Latin phrases that can easily be misinterpreted
and misapplied.100

In State v. Sherer, the defendant pleaded guilty to practicing medicine
under a false name or impersonating a doctor, criminal endangerment, and
aggravated assault.101 Defendant appealed and argued that his conduct in
instructing the victim to cut off her nipple did not constitute aggravated
assault because he contended that “exposure to liability under the statute
would require utilizing tort proximate cause principles.”102 Defendant further argued that “aggravated assault is designated as an offense for which
Sherer must register as a ‘violent offender’ pursuant to § 46–23–504,
MCA; therefore this Court ought to abide by Black’s Law Dictionary’s def93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See infra Appendix 1 for a discussion of the facts and disposition of this case.
43 P.3d 329, 336 (Mont. 2002).
Id. at 336; see Turner, 864 P.2d at 241.
Liefart, 43 P.3d at 336.
State v. Hansen, 989 P.2d 338, 340 (Mont. 1999).
Id.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 356.
60 P.3d 1010, 1011 (Mont. 2002).
Id. at 1012.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol79/iss2/3

14

Gonzalez: The Rule of Lenity
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\79-2\MON203.txt

2018

unknown

Seq: 15

19-OCT-18

THE RULE OF LENITY

13:59

219

inition of ‘violent offenses’ . . . .”103 The Court concluded that “the statute
defining aggravated assault and the statutes defining cause, act, and conduct, pursuant to § 45–1–102(1)(c), MCA, give fair warning that the nature
of [defendant’s] conduct constituted the offense . . . .”104
In City of Missoula v. Paffhausen, the defendant was charged with
driving under the influence.105 The plaintiff successfully filed a motion to
prevent the defendant from claiming involuntary intoxication.106 The defendant then appealed to the district court and it affirmed the municipal court’s
ruling.107 The defendant appealed to the Montana Supreme Court and argued the automatism defense.108 The Court allowed “[defendant] to raise an
automatism defense [to] accomplish the policies provided for in . . . Section
45–1–102(1)(b), MCA, [which] provides that one of the general purposes
of the provisions governing the definition of offenses is to ‘safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal.’”109 The Court
agreed with the point raised by the dissent that:
because Montana’s criminal code is modeled after the Illinois Criminal
Code, we have repeatedly turned to Illinois for guidance in interpreting our
criminal statutes; this does not mean, however, that we must blindly follow
the interpretations of the criminal code provided by the courts in Illinois
without taking into consideration Montana’s unique character and history.110

In State v. Turner, the Court overruled Goodwin, and stated that “[t]he
law of accountability is properly presented and understood[.] To interpret
the statute as [defendant] does in his argument would frustrate the obvious
legislative purpose of Montana’s accountability statutes.”111 The Court declined to follow the common law rule that penal statutes are to be strictly
construed and found that it had no application to the penal code.112 Rather,
the Court explained that “[a]ll its provisions are to be construed according
to the fair import of their terms with a view to effect its object and to promote justice.”113 In doing this, the Court recognized that the Montana Legislature statutorily abrogated the common law rule of strict construction as
applicable to the penal code.114
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id. at 1013.
289 P.3d 141, 144 (Mont. 2012).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 147 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–1–102(1)(b)).
Id. at 149.
864 P.2d 235, 241 (Mont. 1993).
Id. at 241; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–1–102(2).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–1–102(2).
Turner, 864 P.2d at 241.
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In other cases where Montana Code Annotated § 45–1–102 has been
applied, the Court has cited to either subsection (a), (b), or (c) of subsection
(1). Subsections (1)(a)–(d) provide the general purpose statements of the
statute and subsection (2) contains the rule of law. The Court should be
applying and citing to subsection (1) and subsection (2) rather than solely
citing to the purpose statements found in subsection (1). In the cases in
which the rule of lenity was raised, the Court should have cited to Montana
Code Annotated § 45–1–102 because it is the law in Montana and the common law rule of lenity was abolished in 1895.
B. The Court Should Apply Montana Code Annotated § 45–1–102
Despite the rule being that “provisions [in the Code] are to be construed according to the fair import of their terms with a view to effect its
object and to promote justice,”115 the Court fails to adhere to the rule and its
purpose statements, which aim to safeguard the defendant’s rights. Instead,
the Court’s jurisprudence regarding the rule of lenity errantly states that
statutes were either to be strictly construed or found that ambiguous statutes
were not unambiguous, and thus, resolved cases in a manner that was not
always the most fair and just for the defendants. Montana Code Annotated
§ 45–1–102 has been the law since 1895, yet the Court from 1922 until
1993 applied the rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed. After
Turner, the Court has continued to state that penal statutes are to be strictly
construed. Although, the Court usually concludes that the statutes are not
ambiguous and therefore does not need to consider the rule of lenity; the
Court usually does not expressly state as it did in Turner that the rule of
lenity does not apply.
It is not for the Court to make new laws; that is for the legislature. The
law in Montana is Montana Code Annotated § 45–1–102, and it should be
used by defendants, prosecutors, and judges, not as a canon of statutory
interpretation, but as the law. Unlike what is required for the application of
the rule of lenity, the Court need not exhaust all other canons of statutory
interpretation before applying this statute. Additionally, ambiguity and lack
of clarity as to a statute’s meaning is not a prerequisite for the application of
Montana Code Annotated § 45–1–102. The following sub-sections will illustrate what might have occurred if the Court had adhered to the rule that
“provisions are to be construed according to the fair import of their terms
with a view to effect its object and to promote justice.”116
115. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–1–102(2).
116. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–1–102(2).
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1. State v. Pirello
If the Court had applied the rule of reading statutes according to the
ordinary meaning of their terms and to promote justice, then the outcome of
State v. Pirello might have favored the defendant. The issue addressed by
the Court was whether the rule of lenity required that the Montana Marijuana Act (“MMA”) be interpreted in the defendant’s favor.117 Defendant
was charged with felony possession of dangerous drugs for possession of
hashish oil in violation of Montana Code Annotated § 45–9–102.118 Defendant claimed that hashish is included as an exception under the MMA exception for “usable marijuana,” which is defined in the MMA as “any mixture or preparation of marijuana.”119 Defendant claimed that the term was
otherwise unconstitutionally vague and raised the rule of lenity as a defense.120
At the time of the defendant’s arrest, the MMA provided an exception
for possessing marijuana for medical use and provided that “[a] qualifying
patient and that qualifying patient’s caregiver may not possess more than
six marijuana plants and 1 ounce of usable marijuana each.”121 The Court
looked to the definition of “marijuana” as provided in the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), which defined it as “all plant material from the genus
cannabis containing tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”) or seeds of the genus
capable of germination.”122 The Court also looked to the CSA’s definition
of hashish as “distinguished from marijuana, [ ] means the mechanically
processed or extracted plant material that contains [THC] and is composed
of resin from the cannabis plant.”123
However, the term “useable marijuana” was also defined in the MMA
as “the dried leaves and flowers of marijuana and any mixture or preparation of marijuana,” excluding “the seeds, stalks, and roots of the plant.”124
Defendant argued that hashish was a “mixture or preparation of marijuana”
under the MMA and further argued that, “[i]t [was] only when looking to
statutes in other parts of the code that the definition of ‘useable marijuana’
[was] called into question.”125 The Court concluded that, “the MMA was
clear and unambiguous on its face and that the district court’s interpretation
appropriately harmonized the statutes.”126
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

State v. Pirello, 282 P.3d 662, 665 (Mont. 2012).
Id. at 663.
Id.; MONT. CODE ANN. § 50–46–102(10) (2009) (repealed in 2011).
Pirello, 282 P.3d at 663.
Id. at 664 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 50–46–201(2) (2009) (repealed in 2011)).
Id. (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 50–32–101(17) (2009) (repealed in 2011)).
Id. (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 50–46–102(1) (2009) (repealed in 2011)) (emphasis omitted).
Id. (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 50–46–102(10) (2009) (repealed in 2011)).
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
State v. Pirello, 282 P.3d 662, 665 (Mont. 2012).
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Had the Court found the statute was ambiguous and applied Montana
Code Annotated § 45–1–102 to the MMA, hashish would qualify as “useable marijuana” under the § 50–46–101(2) exception for medical use. The
Court would only need to look to the definition of “useable marijuana” as
defined in the MMA and hashish oil is clearly “any mixture or preparation
of marijuana,” as was provided in Montana Code Annotated
§ 50–46–102(10) in 2009.127 Therefore, the Court would not need to look
beyond the definitions found in the MMA because the MMA definitions
adequately covered hashish oil. The Court only needed to give the words
the “fair import of their terms,” meaning their usual and ordinary meaning
as required by Montana Code Annotated § 45–1–102(2).
But even applying the definition of hashish from the CSA as “mechanically processed or extracted plant material that contains [THC] and is composed of resin from the cannabis plant,” and then giving the words their fair
import, a mechanically processed or extracted plant material containing
THC made up of resin from the cannabis plant is clearly also a “mixture or
preparation of marijuana.” If hashish was not to qualify as “any mixture or
preparation,” then the Montana Legislature likely would have stated that in
the statute.
2. State v. Strong
A second example in which the Court should have adhered to the rule
of reading statutes according to the ordinary meaning of their terms, with a
view to statutory effects and to promote justice, is given by State v.
Strong.128 The incarcerated defendant was charged with four counts of violating a protective order in violation of Montana Code Annotated
§ 45–5–626 after calling his wife four times in one day.129 “The first two
counts were charged as misdemeanors, and the third and fourth were
charged as felonies.”130 Defendant pleaded guilty in district court to three of
the four counts, then appealed.131 The statute provided an exception:
[A] defendant may not be convicted of more than one offense for conduct
that is part of the same transaction if the “offense is defined to prohibit a
continuing course of conduct and the defendant’s course of conduct was
interrupted, unless the law provides that the specific periods of the conduct
constitute separate offenses.”132
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 50–46–102(10) (2009) (repealed in 2011).
State v. Strong, 356 P.3d 1078 (Mont. 2015).
Id. at 1079.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1080 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 46–11–410(2)(e)).
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The district court found that the four telephone calls were part of the same
transaction, but the exception under Montana Code Annotated
§ 46–11–410(2)(e) was not applicable “because the underlying statute was
not defined to prohibit a continuing course of conduct.”133
The issue on appeal in Strong was whether the four telephone calls
constituted the same transaction, and if so, did they then meet the exception
found in Montana Code Annotated § 46–11–410(2)(e)?134 The term “same
transaction” is defined by Montana Code Annotated § 46–1–202(23) as
“conduct consisting of a series of acts or omissions that are motivated by
. . . a common purpose or plan that results in the repeated commission of
the same offense or effect upon the same person . . . .”135 The defendant
argued that Montana Code Annotated § 45–5–626(1) was “ambiguous ‘as
to what exactly constituted a complete offense.’”136 In response to the defendant’s argument, the Court iterated that “[i]n interpreting a statute, [it]
must construe statutory language according to its plain meaning . . .” and
stated that “because the plain language of the statute dictates when an offense is complete, [it] need not consider [defendant’s] argument regarding
application of the rule of lenity.”137 The Court agreed with the defendant’s
argument that the calls met the statutory requirement of “same transaction.”138 The defendant also argued that the calls were “part of [one interrupted] conversation that was an ongoing violation . . . .”139 Ultimately, the
Court held that the calls did not meet the exception because the “plain language of § 46–11–410(2)(e), MCA, require[d] that the offense be ‘defined
to prohibit a continuing course of conduct[,]’” and “Section 45–5–626,
MCA, is not ‘defined to prohibit a continuing course of conduct.’”140
If the Court had applied Montana Code Annotated § 45–1–102, then
the Court would have “construed [the statute] according to the fair import
of its terms with a view to effect its object and to promote justice.”141 The
exception for multiple charges, Montana Code Annotated
§ 46–11–410(2)(e), states that:
A defendant may not, however, be convicted of more than one offense if[ ]
. . . the offense is defined to prohibit a continuing course of conduct and the
defendant’s course of conduct was interrupted, unless the law provides that
the specific periods of the conduct constitute separate offenses.142
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Infinity Ins. Co. v. Dodson, 14 P.3d 287, 496 (Mont. 2000)).
Id. at 1081.
Id.
Id. (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 46–11–410(2)(e)).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–1–102(2).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46–11–410(2)(e).
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The Court agreed that Defendant’s conduct of placing four phone calls (at
4:05 p.m., 7:01 p.m., 10:48 p.m., and 10:52 p.m.) on the same day in an
effort to speak to his wife about their pending divorce and child support met
the statutory definition of “same transaction.”143
There was no dispute that defendant violated the no contact order by
placing the first call.144 However, holding that the three additional calls
made on the same evening constituted “separate offenses” rather than a
“continuing course of conduct” was not construing the statute in a manner
of promoting justice. This is especially evident when the last two calls were
made four minutes apart and those two calls were charged felony violations
of the protective order.145 The Court noted that, “[c]harging decisions are
generally within prosecutor’s exclusive domain, and the separation of powers [doctrine] mandates judicial respect for prosecutor’s independence.”146
Nevertheless, judicial respect for prosecutorial independence should not be
a justification for ignoring the rule of construing statutes in a manner that
would promote justice. The justice system is an imperfect system and although it is not for the Court to make laws, it is the Court’s duty to safeguard the rights of the accused and ensure that the punishment fits the
crime. Holding that four phone calls made in one evening constitute four
separate offenses, of which two are to be charged as felonies, does not reflect the Court’s reading of the statute with a view to its effect and with the
purpose of a just outcome.
V. CONCLUSION
The rule of lenity has not been the law in Montana since 1895. Rather,
the law in Montana is that statutes are to be “construed according to the fair
import of their terms with a view to effect its object and to promote justice.”147 In the majority of cases in which the Montana Supreme Court tackled the issue of whether the rule of lenity was applicable, the Court held that
the statutes in question were not ambiguous and therefore the rule of lenity
was not triggered. In some instances, in cases in which the statutes were
ambiguous, the Court held that they were clear and unambiguous. With the
exception of Turner, the Court failed to state that the rule of lenity was not
the law in Montana. The Court could put an end to the illusion of the rule of
lenity’s existence by citing to Montana Code Annotated § 45–1–102, which
provides that, “[t]he rule of the common law, that penal statutes are to be
143. Strong, 356 P.3d at 1079, 1081.
144. Id. at 1080–81.
145. Id. at 1079.
146. Id. at 1082 (quoting State v. Passmore, 225 P.3d 1229, 1244–45 (Mont. 2010)) (changes in
original).
147. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–1–102.
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strictly construed, has no application to this code. All its provisions are to
be construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to
effect its object and to promote justice.”148 Safeguarding the rights of the
innocent and working towards a more perfect justice system should be the
goal of every player in the field of law and the game of statutory construction.

148. Id.
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APPENDIX 1: CRIMINAL CASES IN MONTANA BEGINNING IN 1993
WHERE THE RULE OF LENITY HAS BEEN RAISED
Case

Statute

Conclusion/Finding/Holding

Moore v.
McCormick,
858 P.2d 1254
(Mont. 1993).

Petitioner filed an application
for a writ of habeaus corpus
challenging the denial of his
bail pending appeal.
Petitioner argued that § 4620-204(2) is ambiguous and
that it was not clear what the
legislature intended by the
words “defendant is admitted
to bail.”

The Court concluded that the
statute was not ambiguous
and did not go into a
discussion regarding the rule
of lenity or its application.

Petition
denied.

State v. Berger,
856 P.2d 552
(Mont. 1993).

Defendant was convicted for
the criminal sale of dangerous
drugs in violation of
§ 45–9–101. Defendant
appealed and argued that
§ 46–11–503(1)(b) (the
double jeopardy statute)
applied. Defendant argued
that the 1991 amendments to
the statute eliminated the
“same transaction”
requirement and expanded the
protection of the statute to
unrelated offenses.

The Court looked to House
Judiciary Committee hearings,
bill sponsor comments, and
the 1991 Commission
Comments. The Court stated
that, “[it] [is] required to
avoid any statutory
interpretation that renders any
sections of the statute
superfluous and does not give
effect to all of the words
used.”

Affirmed.

State v. Turner,
864 P.2d 235
(Mont. 1993).

Defendant was convicted of
deliberate homicide by
accountability in violation of
§ 45–5–102(1)(A). Defendant
appealed and argued that
§ 46–18–220 did not require
the death penalty for persons
convicted of accountability
for deliberate homicide. He
further argued that the
aggravating circumstances
listed in § 46-18-303 did not
include accountability for
deliberate homicide.

The Court clarified that “the
Montana legislature has
statutorily abrogated the
common law rule of strict
construction so far as the
penal code is concerned” and
cited § 45–1–102(2). The
Court stated that, “[i]nsofar as
Goodwin is in conflict with
45–1–102(2), MCA, it is
overruled.” The Court stated
that the statutes at issue are
clear and unambiguous and
that the law of accountability
is properly presented and
understood.

Affirmed.

State v.
Gollehon, 864
P.2d 249
(Mont. 1993).

Defendant was convicted of
deliberate homicide by
accountability in violation of
§ 45–5–102(1)(A). Defendant
appealed and argued that the
mitigating evidence he
presented was substantial
enough to call for leniency.

The Court held that the
district court did not err by
failing to rule that mitigating
factors existed and that
mitigating factors were
substantial enough to call for
leniency.

Affirmed.
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Case

Statute

Gollehon v.
State, 986 P.2d
395 (Mont.
1999).

After affirmance of his
conviction, Petitioner
requested that the Court
reconsider its judgment
regarding issues from his
direct appeal. The State
claimed in federal court that
defendant did not present a
due process and fair notice
claim under the 14th
Amendment. Petitioner asked
the Court to look to Justice
Gray’s dissent in the direct
appeal where the court
considered his argument
under the rule of lenity.

Court declined to address
Petitioner’s claim for relief
and stated that
“postconviction relief is not
available upon claims that a
petitioner could have raised
on direct appeal.”

Petition
denied.

State v. Fauque,
4 P.3d 651
(Mont. 2000),
superseded by
statute, MONT.
CODE ANN.
§ 46–18–205(2)
(2013), as
recognized in
State v.
Rambold, 325
P.3d 686, 690
(Mont. 2014).

Defendant pled guilty to one
count of sexual intercourse
without consent in violation
of § 45–5–503 and one count
of sexual assault in violation
of § 45–5–502. Defendant
appealed and argued that a
direct conflict existed
between the 4-year mandatory
minimum sentence under
§ 45–5–503 when victim is
less than 16 and defendant is
3 or more years older and the
30-day minimum sentence
under § 46–18–201 when
victim is less than 16 years
old. Defendant contended that
this created ambiguity under
the rule of lenity.

The Court concluded that no
conflict existed and therefore
the rule of lenity need not be
addressed. The Court stated
that “they first look to the
plain meaning of the statute
and if language is clear and
unambiguous then no further
interpretation is required.”
The Court found that “no
conflict exist[ed], the statutes
were clear and unambiguous
and [the Court] need go no
further than their plain
meaning.”

Affirmed.

State v. Liefart,
43 P.3d 329
(Mont. 2002).

Defendant pled guilty to
partner assault in violation of
§ 45–5–206 in Justice Court.
Defendant was subsequently
charged with unlawful
possession of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(9). Defendant moved
to withdraw his plea and
argued that he was not
informed that he would be
charged with the federal
charge. Justice Court denied
the motion. Defendant
appealed to District Court,
which denied his motion.
Defendant appealed and
argued that “his guilty plea

The Court did not agree that
“federal prohibitions
contingent on a state
conviction or any other
predicate offense requires
reading those statutes together
in the context of accepting
guilty pleas.” The Court
found that the state and
federal statutes each
unambiguously specify the
punishment that may be
brought by each entity. The
Court held that Defendant’s
due process rights of fair
warning were not violated.

Affirmed.
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was not voluntary because he
was not informed of the
federal limitations on
possessing a gun upon
conviction for domestic
violence under state law.”
Defendant made a “negative
implication” argument that
“statutes must give fair
warning.”
State v. Bailey,
87 P.3d 1032
(Mont. 2004).

Defendant convicted for two
counts of incest. Defendant
appealed and argued that “the
District Court erred in
concluding that
§ 45–5–507(4) requires a
four-year mandatory
minimum which cannot be
suspended.” On appeal, he
argued that § 46–18–205(1)
authorized suspension of all
but 30 days. Section
46–18–222 lists exceptions to
the mandatory minimum.

The Court held that none of
the exceptions in
§ 46–18–222 existed and
Defendant had not challenged
that determination. The Court
cited to State v. Fauque, 4
P.3d 651 (Mont. 2000),
superseded by statute, MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46–18–205(2)
(2013), as recognized in State
v. Rambold, 325 P.3d 686,
690 (Mont. 2014), and noted
that here § 46–18–205(1) as
in Faque, the “language
reflects the legislative intent.”

Affirmed.

State v.
Roundstone,
261 P.3d 1009
(Mont. 2011).

Defendant pled guilty to
felony escape and was
sentenced to ten years with
five suspended. Defendant
was placed in a prerelease
center and conditional parole
was granted. Defendant asked
the Court to “conclude that
furlough is pre-certificate
parole. . .and after furlough is
completed the prisoner is
granted post-furlough parole.”

The Court declined to
consider Defendant’s reading
of the statute as it would
essentially require rewriting
the statute. The Court
admitted that furlough and
parole are forms of release
but the “Legislature has not
provided in statute that
furlough, is in fact parole.”
The Court found no
ambiguity in the statute.

Affirmed.

State v. Pirello,
282 P.3d 662
(Mont. 2012).

Defendant was charged with
felony possession of
dangerous drugs,
misdemeanor criminal
possession of dangerous
drugs, misdemeanor
possession of drug
paraphernalia, and driving
under the influence of drugs.
Defendant entered a
conditional guilty plea, then
appealed. Defendant argued
that hashish oil falls under
“exception for useable
marijuana” or “otherwise the

The Court considered MMA
and CSA together and read
them together to determine
the meaning of the term
“usable marijuana.” The
Court concluded that MMA
was clear and unambiguous
on its face.

Affirmed.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol79/iss2/3

24

Gonzalez: The Rule of Lenity
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\79-2\MON203.txt

2018

unknown

Seq: 25

19-OCT-18

THE RULE OF LENITY
Case

Statute

13:59

229

Conclusion/Finding/Holding

Disposition

term is unconstitutionally
vague and rule of lenity
requires MMA to be
interpreted in his favor.”
State v.
Madsen, 317
P.3d 806
(Mont. 2013).

Defendant was charged with
mistreating a prisoner.
Defendant filed a motion to
dismiss claiming that a
detained juvenile was not a
prisoner. The district court
granted the motion and the
State appealed.

The Court found that the
district court had incorrectly
found that the statute was
ambiguous. Court stated that
the “State correctly argued
below that a ‘prisoner’
commonly means a person
whose liberty is restrained by
law enforcement personnel,
for any reason . . .” and “the
fact that a term . . . may
apply to individuals in several
different circumstances does
not make it ambiguous, it
only makes the term
inclusive.” Court found the
word “prisoner” to be “clear
from the ordinary and
common understanding.”

Reversed and
Remanded.

State v.
Matheson, 311
P.3d 443
(Mont. 2013),
decided by
memorandum
opinion, not to
be cited and
does not serve
as precedent.

Defendant argued that “the
Court should apply the rule
of lenity [because] the
circumstances do not allow
him to establish the basis for
his conviction.” Defendant
argued that the Court should
interpret 61–8–722 as
expunging his record.

Court reviewed the question
of law de novo and decided
the case pursuant to 1996
Internal Operating Rules as
amended in 2006. The Court
stated that, “it is clear in the
face of the briefs and the
record that the District Court
correctly interpreted Montana
law.”

Affirmed.

State v. Strong,
356 P.3d 1078
(Mont. 2015).

The incarcerated Defendant
was charged with four counts
of violating a protective order
by calling his wife four times
in one day. Defendant pled
guilty to three of the four
counts and appealed.
Defendant argued that “the
calls were part of the same
ongoing conversation and the
plain language of
46–11–410(2)(e), MCA,
requires that the offense be
defined to prohibit a
continuing course of
conduct.”

Court found the plain
meaning of the statute was
clear and therefore did not
need to consider Defendant’s
argument regarding
application of the rule of
lenity.

Affirmed.
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